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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
000O000 
JANET SHERWOOD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SHARLENE WILLIAMS and GLENDA 
CREBS aka GLENDA KREBS, 
Court of Appeals No, 
890600-CA 
Defendants and Respondents, 
000O000 
BRIEF OF* APPELLANT 
000O000 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is a personal injury action brought in the District 
Court, Pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j) U.C.A., appellate 
jurisdiction is in the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme 
Court has, pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4) transferred this case to 
the Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues presented in this appeal are as follows: 
(a) Did Plaintiff present to the District Court a valid 
cause of action against each defendant herein for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress; and what is the status of such 
a claim, when the Court below refused to rule on it? 
(b) Did Plaintiff present to the District Court a valid 
c a u s e o f a c t i o n a g a i n s t e a c h d e f e n d a n t h e r e i n f o r f a l 
i m p r i s o n m e n t ? 
( c ) Did P l a i n t i f f p r e s e n t t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a v a l 
c a u s e of a c t i o n a g a i n s t D e f e n d a n t S h a r l e n e W i l l i a m s f o r a s s a u 
and b a t t e r y ? 
STATUTORY AND RULE PROVISIONS 
Rule 54(b) U.R.C.P. 
When more than one claim for relief is presented 
in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, 
crossclaim, or third party claim, and/or when multiple 
parties are involved, the Court may direct the entry 
of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than 
all of the claims or parties only upon an expressed 
determination by the Court that there is no just reason 
for delay and upon an expressed direction for the entry 
of judgment. In the absence of such determination and 
direction, any order or other form of decision, however 
designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims 
or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the 
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 
claims or parties, and the order or other form of 
decision is subject to revision at any time before the 
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
Rule 59 U.R.C.P. - New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 
61, a new trial may be granted to all or any of the 
parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a 
motion for a new trial in an action tried without a 
jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of 
fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and 
conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the 
court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the 
court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any 
one or more of the jurors have been induced to assent 
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t o any g e n e r a l or s p e c i a l v e r d i c t , o r t o a f i n d i n g on 
any q u e s t i o n s u b m i t t e d to them by the c o u r t , by r e s o r t 
t o a d e t e r m i n a t i o n by c h a n c e o r a s a r e s u l t of 
b r i b e r y , such misconduc t may be proved by t h e a f f i d a v i t 
of any one of the j u r o r s , 
(3 ) A c c i d e n t or s u r p r i s e , which o r d i n a r y 
prudence could not have guarded a g a i n s t . 
(4 ) Newly d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e , m a t e r i a l f o r 
t h e p a r t y making t h e a p p l i c a t i o n , which he c o u l d n o t , 
wi th r e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e , have d i s c o v e r e d and produced 
a t t h e t r i a l , 
( 5 ) E x c e s s i v e o r i n a d e q u a t e d a m a g e s , 
a p p e a r i n g t o h a v e been g i v e n u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e of 
p a s s i o n or p r e j u d i c e . 
(6) I n s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e e v i d e n c e t o j u s t i f y 
t h e v e r d i c t or o t h e r d e c i s i o n , or t h a t i t i s a g a i n s t 
law, 
(7) E r r o r in law, 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial 
shall be served not later than ten days after the entry 
of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the 
application for a new trial is made under Subdivision 
(a)(1), (2), (3), or \b), it shall be supported by 
affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based 
upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion. 
The opposing party has ten days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time 
within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits 
shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding twenty days either by the court 
for good cause shown or by the parties by written 
stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than ten 
days after entry of judgment the court of its own 
initiative may order a new trial for any reason for 
which it might have granted a new trial on motion of a 
party, and in the order shall specify the grounds 
therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion 
to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not 
later than ten days after entry of the judgment. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is a personal injury action in which Plaintiff brought 
suit against Defendants for assault and battery, false 
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imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Trial was held on April 6, 1989, before Hon. Allen B. Sorensen, a 
Senior Judge of the Fourth District, sitting without a jury. 
Judgment was granted against Defendant Glenda Krebs in the amount 
of $1,500.00 for general damages and $500.00 for punitive damages 
on Plaintiff's claim of assault and battery. The causes of 
action against Defendant Williams for assault and battery and 
false imprisonment were dismissed, as was the cause of action 
against Defendant Krebs for false imprisonment. Plaintiff's 
cause of action against each defendant for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress was not ruled upon in any manner by the 
Court. Immediately after the memorandum decision was rendered by 
the Court, on April 7, 1989, Plaintiff brought a motion to amend 
judgment pursuant to Rule 59 U.R.C.P., bringing the Court's 
attention to the fact that no ruling had been made on one of the 
causes of action against each defendant, and that the Court's 
ruling was against the clear weight of the evidence in its 
dismissals of the other causes of action as recited above. 
Plaintiff contends here that the judgment in the District Court 
was against the clear weight of the evidence, and was contrary to 
law. 
The action arises from an incident on May 24, 1988. On that 
day, the plaintiff went to work at a restaurant in American Fork, 
Utah, known as "Fixin's". On that day, she met George Steven 
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Krebs, known to her as "Steven", who had been a customer once or 
twice before. The two of them had a conversation, and he asked 
her on a date. Prior to the discussion for the date, he had told 
her that he was divorced (R. 131,194). Plaintiff and Mr. Krebs 
went to Sizzler Restaurant, and then back to his apartment to 
watch a videotape of "The Ghost and Mr. Chicken". They arrived 
back at the house approximately 10:00 p.m. (R.196), and shortly 
thereafter, Mr. Krebs received a phone call from his estranged 
wife, from whom he was not actually divorced. His wife did tell 
him on the telephone that she was going to apply for welfare 
assistance and file for divorce. Mr. Krebs told his wife that he 
had a friend over to watch television, and the conversation 
terminated (R.106,132). 
A half hour or so later, a car pulled up, and Mr. Krebs 
realized that his wife was present, so he took Plaintiff into a 
back bedroom, to keep her out of the way (R. 134,196) and told her 
to stay there, and keep the light off. 
Defendant Krebs knocked on the door, yelled, "Steve, let me 
in" (R.107,197), and when refused entry, went around to the back 
door, used her key, and went in. Mr. and Mrs. Krebs confronted 
each other in the kitchen, and a scuffle ensued (R.108,137) 
during which Defendant Krebs called for her mother to come in and 
assist her (R.108,118). Defendant Krebs pushed past her husband 
and went towards the bedroom where Plaintiff had been pushed into 
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hiding by Mr. Krebs (R. 109,119,138,198). 
As Defendant Krebs entered the room, she immediately lunged 
for Plaintiff (and kicked her) (R. 109,199-200). She grabbed 
Plaintiff by the hair, continuing to kick at her, scream 
obscenities, strike her, and scratch at her ( R. 110,124,139-
140,200-207). Mr. Krebs attempted to stop his wife from 
attacking his friend, and was in turn attacked by Defendant 
Williams, who came into the room with a knife, first stating that 
she wanted to "stab the bitch", then confronting Mr. Krebs, 
stating, "you make another step, and I'll stab you along with 
her" (R.121-122,141-142,202). Mr. Krebs ran next door (the Court 
upheld an objection to a question as to whether Mr. Krebs left 
the room out of fear of the knife -- R.143) and called the 
police. 
Tonya Chipman, the neighbor whose phone was used to call the 
police, recognized the name of Janet Sherwood, as a girl she had 
gone to school with, and went over to the Krebs1 home to see what 
was going on (R.180). She knocked on the door, and came into 
contact with Defendant Williams, who answered the door (R.181-
182). Mrs. Williams was carrying a knife, of a blade about three 
to four inches long, with a sharp point and a serrated edge 
(R.186). Because of the threatening manner in which Defendant 
held the knife (R.187), Mrs. Chipman backed off the porch. She 
continued to ask Mrs. Williams to let Janet out of the house, 
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and heard Janet in the background screaming, "Please let me out 
of here" (R.187-188). In return, she was told by Mrs. Williams 
that if she came any closer, she would "get the same thing that 
Janet was going to get", and that Janet was going to get killed 
(R.188). Shortly afterwards, Orem police officers arrived on the 
scene. 
When Officer Merrill Finlayson arrived at the scene shortly 
after 10:40 p.m., he saw Steven Krebs and Defendant Williams on 
the lawn pushing each other (R.150). He, having been advised 
that "there was a woman in the house that's being assaulted" 
(R.152), entered the house. Upon entering the northeast bedroom, 
he saw "two women, one standing above the other one holding the 
hair of Janet Sherwood" (R.152). Plaintiff was "cowering down in 
the corner" and "Mrs. Krebs was holding onto her hair, pulling 
her hair" (R.153). The officer had some difficulty separating 
the two women, as Defendant Krebs initially refused to let go of 
Plaintiff's hair, and kept screaming that she wasn't going to let 
her husband's "whore" into her house (R.154). 
The parties were finally separated, statements were taken, 
and Plaintiff was taken home by another officer. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellant raises three issues for decision by this Court. 
First, Appellant alleges that she has set forth a good and viable 
cause of action against each defendant for intentional infliction 
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of emotional distress. The Court has refused to rule at all on 
that cause of action, despite a post-trial motion by Plaintiff to 
amend the judgment to include such a ruling. By doing so, the 
Court has effectively dismissed Plaintiff's third cause of 
action. Plaintiff contends that the Court: should exercise its 
power to remand this cause of action to the District Court with 
specific instructions to find a cause of action and to determine 
damages. 
Appellant, in her second cause of action, contended that 
each defendant herein was guilty of'false imprisonment. The 
Court, without setting forth findings of fact, dismissed that 
cause of action as to each defendant. Since this is an obviously 
valid cause of action, the dismissal should be reversed, and the 
matter should once again be remanded to the District Court with 
instructions to find a cause of action and to determine damages. 
Finally, Appellant received a judgment below for assault 
against Defendant Krebs only, and her identical cause of action 
against Defendant Williams was dismissed. Once again, this 
dismissal was erroneous on the part of the District Court. That 
dismissal should be reversed and the matter should be remanded to 
the District Court with instructions to find a valid cause of 
action and to determine damages. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD DETERMINE THAT A CAUSE OF ACTION 
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EXISTS ON P L A I N T I F F ' S THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING 
THAT DEFENDANTS INTENTIONALLY CAUSED P L A I N T I F F 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AND SUFFERING; AND SHOULD REMAND 
WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO DETERMINE DAMAGES AGAINST EACH 
DEFENDANT. 
P l a i n t i f f , a s h e r t h i r d c a u s e of a c t i o n i n t h e c o m p l a i n t 
f i l e d b e l o w , a l l e g e d t h a t t h e t w o d e f e n d a n t s h e r e i n , by 
a s s a u l t i n g h e r , by f a l s e l y i m p r i s o n i n g h e r , a n d by t h r e a t e n i n g 
f u r t h e r v i o l e n c e and h a r r a s s m e n t u p o n h e r , i n t e n t i o n a l l y 
i n f l i c t e d e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s upon h e r , f o r w h i c h s h e was e n t i t l e d 
t o r e a s o n a b l e d a m a g e s . I n h e r t r i a l b r i e f , P l a i n t i f f s e t f o r t h 
t h e c a u s e of a c t i o n , r e l y i n g on t h e d o c t r i n e s e n u n c i a t e d i n t h e 
i m p o r t a n t U tah c a s e of Samms v . E c c l e s , 358 P.2d 344 (Utah 1 9 6 1 ) . 
T h a t c a s e s e t f o r t h t h e l e g a l b a s i s f o r s u c h a c l a i m , and h a s 
b e e n w i d e l y q u o t e d by C o u r t s i n o t h e r s t a t e s a s a u t h o r i t y f o r 
s i m i l a r c a u s e s of a c t i o n . The C o u r t , i n r e c o g n i z i n g t h e t o r t of 
i n t e n t i o n a l i n f l i c t i o n of e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s , s t a t e d : 
. . . t h e b e s t c o n s i d e r e d v i e w r e c o g n i z e s an a c t i o n f o r 
s e v e r e e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s , t h o u g h n o t a c c o m p a n i e d by 
b o d i l y i m p a c t o r p h y s i c a l i n j u r y , w h e r e t h e d e f e n d a n t 
i n t e n t i o n a l l y e n g a g e d i n some c o n d u c t t o w a r d t h e 
p l a i n t i f f ( a ) w i t h t h e p u r p o s e of i n f l i c t i n g e m o t i o n a l 
d i s t r e s s , o r , ( b ) w h e r e a n y r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n w o u l d 
h a v e known t h a t s u c h w o u l d r e s u l t ; and h i s a c t i o n s a r e 
of s u c h a n a t u r e a s t o be c o n s i d e r e d o u t r a g e o u s and 
i n t o l e r a b l e i n t h a t t h e y o f f e n d a g a i n s t t h e g e n e r a l l y 
a c c e p t e d s t a n d a r d s of d e c e n c y and m o r a l i t y . T h i s t e s t 
s e e m s t o be a m o r e r e a l i s t i c s a f e g u a r d a g a i n s t f a l s e 
c l a i m s t h a n t o i n s i s t upon f i n d i n g some o t h e r a t t e n d a n t 
t o r t w h i c h may be of m i n o r c h a r a c t e r . 358 P . 2 d a t 3 4 7 . 
W h i l e D e f e n d a n t W i l l i a m s may n o t h a v e been s t r i c t l y g u i l t y 
of t h e t o r t of a s s a u l t , s h e c l e a r l y i n f l i c t e d a d d i t i o n a l and 
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intense emotional distress on Plaintiff by waving a knife around, 
threatening to "kill the bitch11 and preventing help from getting 
to her. This was all done in a concerted effort to increase the 
fear, and to increase the physical injuries, to Plaintiff, in an 
apparent attempt to assist her daughter in seeking revenge on 
Plaintiff and on Steven Krebs for some imagined wrong. As the 
Utah Supreme Court stated in Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696 
(Utah 1985): 
One who intentionally causes severe emotional distress 
to another through extreme and outrageous conduct is 
liable to that person for any resulting damages. 699 
P.2d at 700. 
There can be little doubt that each of the defendants, 
acting in concert, intentionally inflicted emotional distress 
upon Plaintiff. The testimony to that effect, as set forth in 
the introductory section to this brief, is vivid, uncontradicted, 
and largely supported by the testimony of the tortfeasors 
themselves. Defendant Krebs not only assaulted and battered 
Plaintiff, she also held her prisoner against her will, and 
subjected her to additional distress by continuing to call her a 
"whore", continuing to threaten her with additional and serious 
bodily harm, and continuing to subject her to generally 
outrageous treatment. Defendant Williams actively participated 
by waving a knife around, threatening to "kill the bitch", and 
actively thwarting attempts by Steven Krebs and a neighbor, Tonya 
Chipman, to come to the aid of Plaintiff, and protect her from 
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the assault and abuse. In fact, in its Memorandum Decision made 
after trial, the Court stated thusly: 
Although the record might support a prima facie cause 
of action against Defendant Williams for aggravated 
assault upon witnesses Krebs and Chipman, it does not 
support such a charge on the part of Plaintiff. 
Defendant Williams's motion to dismiss as to her is 
granted (R.47). 
Plaintiff submits that the Court below made a serious error 
in severing the alleged assault on Steven Krebs and on Tonya 
Chipman by Defendant Williams, and not considering it as part of 
the whole attack and infliction of distress upon Plaintiff, 
At this point, we must deal with a serious problem. While 
the District Court affirmatively dismissed the causes of action 
as to Defendant Williams for assault, and as to both defendants 
for false imprisonment, the Court made no mention of this third 
cause of action in its ruling. Prior to drafting the final 
order, Counsel for Plaintiff attempted to bring this impossible 
situation to the attention of the District Court by means of a 
motion, pursuant to Rule 59 U.R.C.P., to amend the judgment. 
This motion was based, in part, on Plaintiff's allegation of "an 
error in law in the failure of the Court to render a verdict on 
Count 3 of Plaintiff's complaint." The Court, having considered 
the motion without oral argument, entered a one sentence denial 
of all portions of that motion (R.77)# A final judgment was then 
prepared affirmatively showing that the Court had refused to rule 
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on t h i s c a u s e of a : t i o n . I t i s from t h a t j u d g m e n t t h a t t h i s 
a p p e a l i s r e n d e r e d . 
R u l e 54 (b ) U.R.C.P. , a s s e t f o r t h e a r l i e r , s t a t e s t h a t a 
j u d g m e n t which d o e s n o t d e a l w i t h a l l i s s u e s i s n o t f i n a l . I n 
t h i s a c t i o n , a m a j o r i t y of t h e c l a i m s have been d i s p o s e d of, but 
t h e D i s t r i c t Court has r e f u s e d s t e a d f a s t l y t o e v e r c o n s i d e r t he 
c l a i m s a g a i n s t e a c h d e f e n d a n t f o r i n t e n t i o n a l i n f l i c t i o n of 
e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s . At f i r s t g l a n c e , i t *rould appear t h a t t h i s 
a p p e a l i s s imply p r e m a t u r e . A p p e l l a n t p o i n t s o u t , however , t h a t 
e v e r y e f f o r t h a s been made i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o o b t a i n a 
f i n a l r u l i n g on h e r t h i r d c a u s e of a c t i o n from which an a p p e a l 
c o u l d be b r o u g h t . I t i s s imply beyond t h e a b i l i t y of P l a i n t i f f 
t o do a n y t h i n g f u r t h e r . P r e c e d e n t f o r h a n d l i n g t h i s s i t u a t i o n 
can be found in t h e ca se of P a t e v. Marathon S t e e l Co., 692 P.2d 
765 (Utah 1984), where t h e Court found t h a t i t was n e c e s s a r y for 
t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o c e r t i f y c e r t a i n i s s u e s f o r a p p e a l when 
o t h e r i s s u e s remained t o be d e c i d e d . F a i l u r e to do so , t h e Court 
s a i d , r e s u l t e d i n a n o n f i n a l o r d e r n o t s u b j e c t t o f i n a l a p p e a l . 
The Cour t , however , chose t o t r e a t t h e a p p e a l a s an i n t e r l o c u t o r y 
o n e , and t o g i v e t h e l o w e r C o u r t g u i d a n c e on how t o h a n d l e 
c e r t a i n i s s u e s on t h e i n e v i t a b l e r emand . P l a i n t i f f a s k s t h e 
C o u r t t o do t h e same h e r e . I t i s o b v i o u s t h a t t h i s c a s e w i l l 
need to be remanded, on t h e o t h e r p o i n t s in t h i s a p p e a l , as w e l l 
as t h e i n s t a n t one. U n l e s s t h i s Court s e t s f o r t h what t he lower 
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Court has failed to do, and what it must do, Plaintiff is in a 
position where she cannot obtain the judgment that is due her. 
She simply has no other means to pursue her cause of action. 
In the recent case of Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Utah 
App. 1988), the Court found that the trial Court had failed to 
make specific findings of fact regarding items of marital 
property and debt, had failed to assign values to property it had 
distributed, and had failed to make specific findings as to the 
ability of a husband to pay alimony and child support, as well as 
the wife's earning ability and financial condition. The Court, 
quoting earlier decisions, set forth the following guidelines: 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly held that the trial 
Court must make findings on all material issues. These 
findings "should be sufficiently detailed and include 
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which 
the ultimate conclusions on each factual issue was 
reached." (Citations omitted). 754 P.2d at 958. 
The Court then found that a failure to meet those standards 
required d remand to the trial Court, and stated: 
We therefore vacate those portions of the judgment 
pertaining to alimony and child support and remand this 
case to the District Court for specific findings that 
support new judgment and decree provisions addressing 
both these issues. 754 P.2d at 959. 
Plaintiff asks the Court to remand this case for further 
consideration of the trial Court. Plaintiff maintains, however, 
that the necessity of remand should not interfere with the duty 
of this Courtto decide questions of law. At the trial, the 
Court, of its own volition, continually questioned Plaintiff's 
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presentation of evidence, as to its relevancy. When Defendants 
entered into the home, there was at first a scuffle in the 
kitchen, resulting in Defendants pushing past Steven Krebs 
towards Plaintiff, in the bedroom. When Plaintiff tried to set 
the stage for the activity in the bedroom, the Court stated: 
That might be interesting, but what does it show me as 
to the cause of action that you've brought against 
Williams and Krebs? (R.138). 
When Steven Krebs testified that Defendant Williams had 
displayed a knife to him, stating, "You make another step, and 
I'll stab you along with her" (R.141), the Court sustained an 
objection (R.143) when Plaintiff's Counsel tried to ask Mr. Krebs 
whether he felt he had been in physical danger from the knife. 
When Mrs. Chipman, the next door neighbor, testified that she had 
attempted to go to the home where Plaintiff was being held 
prisoner, to give her any assistance possible, she testified she 
was confronted with the knife-wielding Mrs. Williams at the front 
door. While the Court allowed questioning along this line to 
proceed (R.184-189), Counsel was continually interrupted by 
statements from the Court questioning the relevance (see 
R.184,185,186). In fact, the Court at one point stated, after an 
exchange on relevance: 
I must leave at 5:00 p.m. for personal matters. And 
I'm interested in moving this case forward. And I've 
decided that the only way I can do it is to let each 
counsel wander all over the pasture, and then I'll try 
to sort out what is relevant and what is not. (R.185). 
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The testimony that was described by the Court as wandering 
"all over the pasture" was that Defendant Williams confronted 
Tonya Chipman, at the front door, with a sharp knife, made 
threatening gestures with it, and threatened to kill both 
Plaintiff and Mrs. Chipman (R.186-188). The point is that this 
testimony was extremely relevant to show the concerted action of 
both defendants to assault, falsely imprison, and inflict 
emotional distress on Plaintiff, and to prevent anyone else from 
interfering with that action. It appears to be clear that the 
Court was more concerned about a personal matter to be taken care 
of after Court, than it was in the testimony presented before it. 
It also appears that the trial Court has missed the important 
legal issues presented by Plaintiff's second and third causes of 
action. If the Court should remand this case to the District 
Court for further consideration without instructions as to the 
propriety of Plaintiff's third cause of action, justice will 
simply not be served. This Court can and should find that, as a 
matter of law, both defendants, working in concert, intentionally 
inflicted emotional distress on Plaintiff. Remand after specific 
instruction on those issues would lead to a judgment consistent 
with the law and avoid unnecessary further appeals. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT, FOR NO CAUSE OF ACTION, ON HER CLAIM OF 
FALSE IMPRISONMENT AGAINST DEFENDANTS. 
The trial Court did find a cause of action against Defendant 
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Glenda Krebs for assdalling Plaintiff, and assessed damages 
therefor. The assault, however, was worsened and compounded by 
the forced and false imprisonment of Plaintiff while it occurred. 
Defendant Krebs admitted her intention to imprison Plaintiff 
clearly in her testimony. In answer to a question (R.110) as to 
whether she continued striking Plaintiff, she stated, "I could 
not. I was holding her hair the entire time with both hands." 
In her written statement to the police, made that night, and 
entered as Plaintiff's exhibit number five, Defendant Krebs 
indicated that, in reference to Plaintiff, "I held her hair so 
she couldn't run". At trial, she stated once again her clear 
intention to hold onto her hair, thus keeping her in the room 
"until the police came" (R.112). It has already been discussed 
at some length how Defendant Williams assisted her by holding off 
help, and turning aside the pleadings of Tonya Chipman to let her 
come out. As also indicated, Tonya Chipman testified that during 
her discussion, held at knifepoint, with Mrs. Williams at the 
door, she continued to hear Plaintiff yell, from the bedroom, 
"please get me out of here" (R.188). 
Defendant Williams, in describing her part in the action, 
stated that she grabbed a knife, and "asked" Steven Krebs to 
leave the room where he was attempting to aid Plaintiff (R.121). 
She described what she saw, when Steven left the room as "Glenda 
was holding onto her hair and had her in a corner" (R.124). She 
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also testified that it was her daughter's declared intention to 
keep Plaintiff there until the police got there (R.124). It is 
as obvious and clear as anything can be, and completely 
uncontroverted, that she did everything she could to aid her 
daughter in so doing, by using the knife, or threatening to use 
the knife,, on anyone who would interfere. 
In the Utah Supreme Court case of Mildon v. Bybee, 375 P.2d 
458 (Utah 1962), the Court outlined the tort of false 
imprisonment as follows: 
We have no disagreement with the defendant's averment 
that the Plaintiff did not suffer any great 
inconvenience. Nevertheless, false imprisonment occurs 
whenever there is an unlawful detention or restraint of 
another against his will. The right to be free from 
restraint of one's person is one of the most 
fundamental and cherished of freedoms. It is the 
policy of the law to afford it the highest degree of 
protection possible consistent with the rights of 
others. 375 P.2d at 459. 
Regarding the assessment of punitive damages in a false 
imprisonment case, the Utah Supreme Court has said: 
Generally in personal injury cases the rule is that 
before the jury can award punitive or exemplary damages 
the party against whom the damages are to be awarded 
must have acted willfully and maliciously. However, it 
has long been the rule that in false imprisonment cases 
punitive damages may be awarded when the wrongful act 
is done recklessly or in open disregard of one's civil 
obligations in the rights of others. 
This presumed malice or malice in law does not consist 
of personal hate or ill will of one person towards 
another but rather refers to that state of mind which 
is reckless of law and of the legal rights of the 
citizen in a person's conduct towards that citizen. 
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T h e r e f o r e , i n f a l s e i m p r i s o n m e n t c a s e s t h e d e f e n d a n t 
need n o t a c t w i t h a c t u a l i l l w i l l or h a t r e d t o w a r d t h e 
p e r s o n b e i n g c o n f i n e d . I n s u c h c a s e , m a l i c e i n l a w 
w i l l be i m p l i e d from u n j u s t i f i a b l e c o n d u c t wh ich c a u s e s 
t h e i n j u r y c o m p l a i n e d o f o r f r o m a w r o n g f u l a c t 
i n t e n t i o n a l l y done w i t h o u t c a u s e or e x c u s e . T e r r y v . 
Z i o n s C o - o p M e r c a n t i l e I n s t i t u t i o n , 6 0 5 P .2d 3 1 4 a t 
3 2 7 . 
D e f e n d a n t K r e b s h a s a d m i t t e d t o f a l s e l y i m p r i s o n i n g 
P l a i n t i f f , and D e f e n d a n t W i l l i a m s h a s a d m i t t e d t o a s s i s t i n g h e r 
i n d o i n g s o . The C o u r t , w i t h no f i n d i n g s of f a c t t o j u s t i f y 
i t s e l f , h a s s i m p l y d e n i e d t h e c a u s e of a c t i o n a g a i n s t b o t h 
d e f e n d a n t s . To do so i s an e r r o r i n l a w . At t h e v e r y l e a s t , t h e 
C o u r t s h o u l d be i n s t r u c t e d o n c e a g a i n , a s p e r S t e v e n s v . S t e v e n s , 
s u p r a , t h a t f i n d i n g s of f a c t m u s t be made t o j u s t i f y s u c h a 
d e c i s i o n . O b v i o u s l y , s e e i n g o n c e a g a i n t h e l o w e r C o u r t ' s 
r e l u c t a n c e t o a p p l y t h e o b v i o u s l a w t o t h e s i t u a t i o n , g u i d e l i n e s 
c a n and s h o u l d be p r o v i d e d t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a s t o w h a t l e g a l 
c o n c l u s i o n s i t s h o u l d come t o o n c e t h e r e l e v a n t f a c t s a r e s e t 
f o r t h i n i t s r e v i s e d f i n d i n g s . 
I I I . ONE WHO MERELY AIDS AND ABETS A PERPETRATOR IN AN 
ASSAULT AND BATTERY I S CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGES 
DONE. 
The i s s u e of w h e t h e r o r n o t an i n d i v i d u a l who by a n y m e a n s 
a i d s o r e n c o u r a g e s an a s s a u l t and b a t t e r y i s e q u a l l y l i a b l e w i t h 
t h e d i r e c t p e r p e t r a t o r d o e s n o t a p p e a r t o h a v e b e e n c l e a r l y 
d e c i d e d i n U t a h . S e v e r a l o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s , h o w e v e r , h a v e r u l e d 
on t h e i s s u e . 
I n 1 9 7 9 , t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s o f New M e x i c o , i n 
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Rael v, Cadena, 604 P.2d 823 (N.M. App. 1979) held that civil 
liability for assault and battery is not limited to the direct 
perpetrator, but does extend to any person who by any means aids 
or encourages the act. In that case, Eddie Rael filed suit 
against Emilio Cadena and Manuel Cadena for assault and battery. 
It was the plaintiff's testimony that Emilio Cadena, after Manuel 
began to hit Plaintiff, yelled to Manuel in Spanish, "Kill him!" 
and "Hit him more!" The trial Court found Emilio jointly liable 
for the battery, and Emilio Cadena appealed the decision. In its 
decision, the Court of Appeals stated as follows: 
It is clear, however, that in the United States, civil 
liability for assault and battery is not limited 
to the direct perpetrator, but extends to any person 
who by any means aids or encourages the act. Rael v. 
Cadena, N.M. App., 604 P.2d 823 (1979). 
The Court referred to several Court cases in various 
jurisdictions, and also quoted from the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts Section 876 (1979): 
According to the Restatement: 
[f]or harm resulting to a third person from the 
tortious conduct of another, one is subject to 
liability if he 
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a 
breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or 
encouragement to the other so to conduct himself. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 876 (1979). 604 
P.2d at 823. 
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More recently, in Williams v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., 
650 P.2d 343 (Alaska 1982), the Supreme Court of Alaska held that 
one who acts in concert with others to plan or assist in 
commission of a tort is liable as a tortfeasor. In that case, 
the bus driver was assaulted and beaten by union members, and 
there was evidence showing that a union steward had gotten the 
union members together and incited them to assaulting the 
plaintiff. In its decision, the Court stated, "One who acts in 
concert with others to plan or assist in the commission of a tort 
is liable as a tortfeasor", 650 P.2d at 348. The Court then cited 
Prosser as follows: 
The original meaning of a "joint tort" was that of 
vicarious liability for concerted action. All persons 
who acted in concert to commit a trespass, in pursuance 
of a common design, were held liable for the entire 
result. In such a case there was a common purpose, 
with mutual aid in carrying it out; in short, there was 
a joint enterprise, so that "all coming to do an 
unlawful act, and of one party, the act of one is the 
act of all of the same party being present." Each was 
therefore liable for the entire damage done, although 
one might have battered the plaintiff, while another 
imprisoned him, and a third stole his silver buttons. 
All might be joined as defendant in the same action at 
law, and since each was liable for all, the jury would 
not be permitted to apportion the damages. The rule 
goes back to the early days when the action of trespass 
was primarily a criminal action; and it has survived 
also in the criminal law. This principle, somewhat 
extended beyond its original scope, is still law. All 
those who, in pursuance of a common pLan or design to 
commit a tortious act, actively take part in it, or 
further it by cooperation or request, or who lend aid 
or encouragement to the wrongdoer, or ratify and adopt 
his acts done for their benefit, are equally liable 
with him. W. Prosser, The Law of Tort, Section 46, at 
291-92 (4th ed. 1971) (footnote omitted). 650 P.2d at 
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348. 
In the present case, there is uncontroverted evidence that 
Defendant Williams was actively involved in the conspiracy to 
commit assault and battery on Plaintiff by preventing anybody 
from assisting Plaintiff, and by yelling words of encouragement 
to Defendant Krebs. Steven Krebs testified that "she said to 
Glenda to keep her in there" ( R. 14 0). Mr. Krebs also testified 
that Defendant Williams said, "Let's stab the bitch," and a few 
seconds later threatened Mr. Krebs himself, saying, "You make 
another step, and I'll stab you along with her" (R.141). 
Tonya Chipman also testified that Defendant Williams 
prevented any assistance from being rendered to Plaintiff. She 
testified that Defendant Williams came to the door of the 
residence with a knife in her hand; upon being specifically 
questioned, Mrs. Chipman stated that she felt Defendant Williams 
was threatening her when she came to the door to ask about the 
plaintiff (R.186-187). Mrs. Chipman also testified that she 
went to the door and requested Mrs. Williams to please let Janet 
go, and in response, Defendant Williams asked Mrs. Chipman if she 
would like to come in and get the same thing that Janet was going 
to get. Defendant Williams then told Mrs. Chipman that she was 
going to kill Janet. In response to this, Mrs. Chipman backed 
farther off the front porch (R.187-189). 
There is no question that Defendant Williams was involved in 
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t h e i n c i d e n t t h a t o c c u r r e d t h a t e v e n i n g . S h e d r o v e w i t h h e r 
d a u g h t e r t o t h e r e s i d e n c e ; s h e knew h e r d a u g h t e r was g o i n g t o a t 
l e a s t s e e t h a t P l a i n t i f f was n o t a l l o w e d t o l e a v e u n t i l t h e 
p o l i c e a r r i v e d , a l s o k n o w i n g t h a t P l a i n t i f f h a d c o m m i t t e d no 
b r e a c h o f t h e p e a c e t o j u s t i f y s u c h d e t e n t i o n . T h e r e i s 
s u b s t a n t i a l t e s t i m o n y t h a t s h e p r e v e n t e d a t l e a s t two p e o p l e from 
r e n d e r i n g a i d t o P l a i n t i f f ; and t h e r e i s e v i d e n c e t h a t D e f e n d a n t 
W i l l i a m s y e l l e d e n c o u r a g e m e n t t o h e r d a u g h t e r w h i l e s h e h e l d and 
a s s a u l t e d P l a i n t i f f . 
B a s e d on t h e c a s e s c i t e d a b o v e , a n d t h e g e n e r a l s t a t e m e n t s 
of l a w q u o t e d from P r o s s e r and t h e R e s t a t e m e n t ( S e c o n d ) of T o r t s , 
" i t i s c l e a r t h a t D e f e n d a n t W i l l i a m s was a p a r t y t o e v e r y t h i n g 
t h a t h a p p e n e d t o P l a i n t i f f . D e f e n d a n t W i l l i a m s m u s t be f o u n d 
l i a b l e . W i t h o u t h e r a i d , t h e i n c i d e n t w o u l d h a v e s t o p p e d much 
s o o n e r , and t h e C o u r t s h o u l d h o l d D e f e n d a n t W i l l i a m s l i a b l e f o r 
h e r a c t i o n s a s a p a r t i c i p a n t i n t h e a s s a u l t and b a t t e r y , a s w e l l 
a s t h e o t h e r c a u s e s of a c t i o n p r e v i o u s l y d i s c u s s e d . The D i s t r i c t 
C o u r t c o m m i t t e d r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r In d i s m i s s i n g t h i s c a u s e of 
a c t i o n a g a i n s t D e f e n d a n t W i l l i a m s . 
CONCLUSION 
The C o u r t b e l o w e r r o n e o u s l y d i s m i s s e d P l a i n t i f f ' s c a u s e s of 
a c t i o n a g a i n s t D e f e n d a n t W i l l i a m s f o r a s s a u l t and a g a i n s t b o t h 
d e f e n d a n t s f o r f a l s e i m p r i s o n m e n t . No j u s t i f i c a t i o n was shown by 
e n t e r i n g s u p p o r t i n g f i n d i n g s of f a c t . T h e s e d i s m i s s a l s mus t be 
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v a c a t e d , and t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t s h o u l d be i n s t r u c t e d t o r e i n s t a t e 
t h o s e c a u s e s of a c t i o n and t o d e t e r m i n e d a m a g e s . The D i s t r i c t 
C o u r t s h o a l d a l s o be g i v e n g u i d e l i n e s a s t o d e c i d i n g P l a i n t i f f ' s 
t h i r d c a u s e of a c t i o n , and t h a t c a u s e s h o u l d a l s o be r e m a n d e d f o r 
t h e e n t r y of a p p r o p r i a t e f i n d i n g s a n d t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of 
d a m a g e s . 
DATED t h i s ) e ? h day of h/o^^L^ , 1989 . 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS 
4: • Andrew McCullough 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /j£ day of 
)}/6KJ*MJLI^ _, 1989, I did mail four true and correct copies 
of the above and foregoing Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid, 
to Sharlene Williams, Attorney Pro Se, 1404 Camp Williams Lane, 
Bluffdale, Utah 84065; and to Glenda Krebs, Attorney Pro Se, 355 
































i f f I M P _ i pt i i . r v i .-J Abb ; n , | : U4 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH (A2170) 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES, & IVINS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
930 South State Street, Suite 10 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 224-2119 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 









civil NO. a iifr/c./c 
oooOooo 
COMES NOW t h e P l a i n t i f f , who c o m p l a i n s of D e f e n d a n t and 
fo r c a u s e s of a c t i o n , a l l e g e s as f o l l o w s : 
1. The a c t i v i t i e s of D e f e n d a n t s wh ich g a v e r i s e t o t h i s 
c o m p l a i n t took p l a c e i n Utah County , S t a t e of Utah . 
2 . On o r a b o u t May 2 4 , 1 9 8 8 , D e f e n d a n t s , and e a c h of 
them, a s s a u l t e d and b a t t e r e d P l a i n t i f f by k i c k i n g h e r , p u l l i n g 
he r h a i r , t h r e a t e n i n g he r wi th a k n i f e and t h r e a t e n i n g her w i th 
o t h e r v i o l e n c e . 
3 . The a c t i o n s of D e f e n d a n t s a s a f o r e s a i d c a u s e d 































4. The actions of Defendants as aforesaid caused 
Plaintiff pain and suffering for which she is entitled to 
compensation in an amount to be determined at trial. 
5. The actions of Defendants were willful and malicious 
for which Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages against 
Defendants in an amount to be determined at trial. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs one through five of her 
first cause of action as though they were fully set forth 
herein. 
2. Defendants, at the date and place aforesaid, willfully 
and falsely imprisoned Plaintiff, holding her against her will 
and causing her additional injury and damages in amounts to be 
proved at trial. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs one through five of the 
first cause of action and one through two of the second cause of 
action as though fully set forth herein. 
2. At the time and place aforesaid, Defendants, by virtue 
of the acts complained of above, and through threats of further 
violence and harassment, intentionally caused the infliction of 
emotional distress upon Plaintiff for which Plaintiff is 
sCuDough, J O D M , 
A M M 





























entitled to compensation from Defendants in an amount to be 
determined at trial. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants, 
and each of them, as follows: 
1. For compensatory damages in an amount to be determined 
at trial. 
2. For damages for pain and suffering in an amount to be 
determined at trial. 
3. For punitive damages in an amount to be determined at 
trial. 
A. For such other and further relief as the Court deems 
equitable and proper in the premises. 
DATED this day of July, 1988. 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES, & IVINS 
W. Andrew McCullough 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CuDough, Jonas, 
ftlvint 
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SHARLENE WILLIAMS and GLENDA 
CREBS, 
Defendants. 
Case Number' CV 88 1616 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
DATED: April 7, 1989 
******** 
Although the record might support a prima facie cause 
of action against defendant Williams for aggravated assault upon 
witnesses Krebs and Chipman, it does not support such a charge on 
the part of plaintiff. Defendant Williams's motion to dismiss as 
to her is granted. 
The court finds that defendant Krebs willfully and 
maliciously committed assault and battery upon plaintiff from 
which plaintiff suffered insignificant physical pain but 
substantial emotional distress. Plaintiff is awarded judgment 
against defendant Krebs in the amount of $1,500.00 general 
damages and $500.00 punitive damages. 
The court finds no cause of action on Count 2 of the 
complaint. 
Plaintiff's counsel should prepare findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and judgment, obtain defense counsel's 
endorsement "approved as to form" thereon, and submit the 
documents to the court. 































W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH (A2170) 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
930 South State Street, Suite 10 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 224-2119 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 





FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. CV88-1616 SHARLENE WILLIAMS and GLENDA 
CREBS aka GLENDA KREBS, 
Defendants. 
oooOooo 
This matter came on regularly for trial on the 6th day of 
April, 1989 before Hon. Allen B. Sorensen, Judge Pro Tern of the 
above-entitled Court. Plaintiff was present with her attorney, W. 
Andrew McCullough. Defendants were present with their attorney, 
Stanley Smith. The Court, having heard evidence on behalf of the 
parties, and being fully advised in the premises, now makes and 
enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The activities which gave rise to this cause of action 
took place in Utah County, State of Utah on or about May 24, 1988. 
2. At the time and place aforesaid, Defendant Krebs 
:Cullough, Jones, 
& Ivtnt 




























willfully and maliciously assaulted and battered Plaintiff. 
3. As approximate result of the assault and battery 
referred to above, Plaintiff suffered insignificant physical pain 
but substantial emotional distress. 
4. It is reasonable that Plaintiff be awarded judgment 
against Defendant Krebs in the amount of $1,500.00 for general 
damages. 
5. Because of the willful and malicious nature of the 
conduct, it is reasonable that Plaintiff be awarded judgment 
against Defendant Krebs in the amount of $500.00 for punitive 
damages• 
6. The Court finds that Defendant Williams did not 
participate in the assault and battery committed by Defendant 
Krebs and therefore that it is reasonable that Plaintiff's 
complaint as to Defendant Williams be dismissed. 
7. The Court finds that Plaintiff's second cause of 
action, alleging false imprisonment has not been substantiated 
and, therefore, it is reasonable that said second cause of action 
be dismissed. 
8. The Court makes no findings of fact regarding 
Plaintiff's third cause of action, alleging intentional infliction 
of emotional distress. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
































Krebs in the amount of $1,500.00 general damages for assault and 
battery upon Plaintiff by Defendant Krebs. 
2. Plaintiff should be awarded judgment against Defendant 
Krebs in the amount of $500.00 punitive damages as a result of the 
willful and malicious nature of the actions of Defendant Krebs in 
committing the assault and battery. 
3. The complaint against Defendant Williams for assault 
and battery should be dismissed, no cause of action. 
4. Plaintiff's second cause of action, alleging false 
imprisonment, should be dismissed as to both defendants, no cause 
of action. 
5. The Court makes no conclusions regarding Plaintiff's 
third cause of action alleging intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. 
DATED this 1 day of A W > ^ \ , 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
A l l e n B. S o r e n s e n , J u d g e P r o Tern 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
• / ^ 
I h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t on t h e (u' d a y of J u n e , 1 9 8 9 , I 
d i d s e n d a t r u e a n d c o r r e c t c o p y o f t h e a b o v e a n d f o r e g o i n g 
f i n d i n g s of f a c t a n d c o n c l u s i o n s of l a w , p o s t a g e p r e p a i d , t o 
S h a r l e n e W i l l i a m s , A t t o r n e y P r o S e , 1 4 0 4 Camp W i l l i a m s L a n e , 
B l u f f d a l e , U t a h 8 4 0 6 5 ; and t o G l e n d a K r e b s , A t t o r n e y P r o S e , 355 
CutkxjQh, Jone*. 
& tans 
































30 South State St 































S ' i ; ,:: 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH (A2170) 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
930 South State Street, Suite 10 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 224-2119 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 





SHARLENE WILLIAMS, and 
GLENDA CREBS aka GLENDA 
KREBS, 
MOTION TO AMEND 
JUDGMENT 




COMES NOW t h e P l a i n t i f f in ' t h e a b o v e - e n t i t l e d a c t i o n 
and moves t h e C o u r t , p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 9 ( a ) ( 6 ) ( 7 ) t o amend t h e 
j u d g m e n t h e r e i n . T h i s m o t i o n i s made on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t t h e 
e v i d e n c e i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y t h e g r a n t i n g of D e f e n d a n t 
W i l l i a m s ' motion t o d i s m i s s , and t h e f i n d i n g of no c a u s e of a c t i o n 
on Count 2 of P l a i n t i f f ' s c o m p l a i n t . P l a i n t i f f a l s o c o n t e n d s t h a t 
t h o s e v e r d i c t s a r e a g a i n s t l aw. A d d i t i o n a l l y , P l a i n t i f f a l l e g e s 
an e r r o r i n l aw i n t h e f a i l u r e of t h e C o u r t t o r e n d e r a v e r d i c t on 
Count 3 of P l a i n t i f f ' s c o m p l a i n t . T h i s m o t i o n i s b a s e d upon t h e 
r e c o r d s and p l e a d i n g s h e r e i n and upon t h e memorandum of p o i n t s and 
a u t h o r i t i e s s u b m i t t e d h e r e w i t h . 
CuHough, Jon**. 
AMnt 































30 South State St 
DATED this a. day of April, 1989. 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES, & IVINS 
^ -Z 
W. Andrew McCullough 
A t t o r n e y fo r P l a i n t i f f 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t on t h e i^/-^" day of April., 
1989, I did mail a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing motion to amend judgment, postage prepaid, to Stanley 
Smith, Attorney for Defendants, P.O. Box 310, American Fork, Utah 
84003. 
U 
f 'jHl UQJk. 
& 
:N THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT L . \ a v ^ ( ^ ^ y ^ \ > 
_ _ _ ^ ^ _ Doouty UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
******* 
JANET SHERWOOD, ) 
Plaintiff. ) 
vs. ) 
SHARLENE WILLIAMS and GLENDA 
CREBS, ) 
Defendant. 
Case Number CV 88 1616 
Dated May 26, 1989 
ALLEN B. SORENSEN 
******** 
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Judgment filed on 14th day 
of April, 1989 is denied. 
Dated this 26th day of May, 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
V 
ALLEN B. SORENSEN, JUDGE 
cc: counsel 
TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT GLENDA KREBS 
A * had beer, . >•- , 'pen seeing 
a marriage . i tuid hnii I suspected that 
my husband was cheating on me. HP tc-i a 
detective. I couJrin ( afford it. So wanted to see 
witv i suspected. So 1 wanted to 
see. 
Q What did votj Db-er\ - *b; , vou •-
vsiidL tin,? "t ihc i.o.^ .^  v'.^ J 
you arrive a r. w u: r -nc . .-. American r . r K ? 
A -as somewhere after 10:00, !":30. 
Q A/ . . you observe when you arrived? 
A When :-. u S i ed nn. a.l t:l: le J ights ii I 
house were off. The -> n i v i i g h t I c o t 11 d, see c o m i n g 
from t: •• vsindow was the T.V. 
The ru r t a 1 ns W P T • - , I iu 
Steve set up off t. iv:- couch. 
-.rproached * h < * 
screen do" - r I oeked so coulu 
with m y k e y , ~ ' k n o c k e d , a n i: *,:^ 
in. 
I did not raise *M\ % i^e^ I -Mi*' ^ i d , 
"Steve, let me in." up d i - * ; - o 
the back doer and opened :i t and u^nr in. 
Q You .:: : -, -ML xaise your voice? 
A I d i d n o t . 
He had t h e 
K l I I i 1 n i l 
•j I dn ' t l e t nit-
1 4 . 
Q You went in the back door, and that was 
open; is that correct? 
A I opened it with my key. 
Q All right. 
And what did you do then? 
A Steve came around the corner and imme-
diately started trying to throw me out of the house. 
He — 
He threw me back against the door, and it 
closed again and it was locked. So I unlockekd the 
door and called to my mom. 
And Steve continued throwing me around 
the kitchen. 
And he was holding me by the arms shaking 
me when my mother came in. And --
Q Where did that scuffle occur? 
A Right out the back door. 
THE COURT: Was this a scuffle with 
your husband? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: That's not relevant to 
this, is it? 
MR. McCULLOUGH: No, Your Honor. 
Ifm moving it as quickly as I can. 



























Q (By Mr. McCullough) What occurred after 
that:7 
Thank you. 
A My mother came in and told Steve to gee 
h is ha nds o ff o f i n e, no t t o hurt me. 
- ' • " VN y ( he- l i t on n f m P n t ] \, | , , [ h e 
a p a r t m e n t t< i * >* t ^ r - vh- hf h<a 1 w i t h h im. 
Q 
What _ : , . -. ;t 
A Nothing. The apart men" was i ark, and she 
was i i: :i the 1 * ' - t ^ mi on m e L - * 
Q Did y o ii g o i n t o t h e r: -I c k b e d i o o m w h e r e s!: i e 
was hiding? 
A Yes, 'id. 
Q What occuire:; Lien? 
A She got up it : : he bed and went into the 
cor OPr 
I went over ant3 b> tt le 
hair. 
At that time Steve came in. He tried > 
get between us. 
kicked and i t h11 her In the shi n I 
was wearing my sandals, so it hurt my toe more than 
anything, 
Steve, tried to get between us. My mother 
J 6. 
come up and she told Steve to leave the house, that 
she had called the police and the police would be 
| coming. Just to leave the house. 
| wasnf t goin 
1 found him 
| my divorce 
me. 
1 Q 












I held her by the hair and told her she 
g anywhere until the police came. 
I wanted a documented report that I had 
with somebody, so when I went to file for 
that r had proof that he was unfaithful to 
You told us about one kick. Is that the 
ou struck? 
That's the only blow I struck. 
You did not kick her several times? 
No; I did not. 
You didn't gouge her with your finger-
No; I did not. 
I could not. I was holding her hair the 
with both hands. 
You didn't stike her several times with 
No; I did not. 
THE COURT: How old are you? 
I'm 26. 
THE COURT: How long were you mar-
17. 
ried? 
THE WITNESS: " • r •• • years. 
THE COURT: How 1 ong did VMI I- n-w 
your husband before you married him? 
THE WITNESS: About six months. 
THE C0UR1 Proceed. 
Q (By -^ McC-ilI:.. . >o the onlv .-.I: tempt 
3 - • K I C K iier unce with your 
f o: r : : - \ : . r r t a ' 
A - r c-\e~ -r rerrring to kick her. I 
was a. 11empt:I ng to keep Steve f r om between us . 
Q And your foot just happened to ^til-M tu-jr: 
because -- by mistake; is that correct? 
A I 1 s ii i t -=»d my lei? f * 'u I ^V 
h e r . I w a s a 1 m o^i r i
 {- • ' a g a i n s : h e r . "I'. - i 
w a y I c o u 1 d h a v e a c t u a 11 y m a d e a s e r i o u s attempt, t o 
k I c k a 1: f I e r . 
Q D i d it a p p e a r to y o u , . J - : -, t hat 
J a n e t w a n t e d to get out of t r 
A She never said uncc -he wanted tc leave. 
She never made an attempt. She never ^i.. 
door. She hid in the room. 
Q But you had ahold of her so she couldn't 
do that; is tha t right ? 











Did you file a report on this instance 
police department that night? 
I wrote a written statement, yes. 
Showing you Plaintiff's. Exhibit Number 5, 
f you can identify this. 
Yes. That's the statement that I gave 
night. j 
All right. j 
Referring to that statement just briefly, 
say in there something, Mrs. Krebs, to the 







Was that your intention in holding onto her 
night? 
I wanted to keep her there until the 
police came for a police report that she was in my 







And so you did, in fact, intend to stop 
leaving by holding onto her hair; is that cor-
Yes. j 
MR. McCULLOUGH: Thank you. 
Move for the admission of Exhibit Number 5, 
19 . 
TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT SHARLENE WILLIAMS 
not open. It was locked. 
I hit on the door with both my fists and 
, said, "Let me in. Steve, you let me in." And the 









I went in. Steve and Glenda was shuffling 
the kitchen. He knocked — ! 
Well, we'll — 
Well, go ahead. He had knocked — j 
He had knocked her so hard that the table 
place. l 
THE COURT: Who had? 
THE WITNESS: Steve, her husband. i 
(By Mr. McCullough) Did you see that 
No; I didn't see it. I seen him still 
have a hold of her. And he continued to hold, and 
i yank and p 
him to let 
Q 
1 A 
jsh on her. i 
And I even grabbed a hold of his shirt for ' 
go, and he wouldn't let go of her. j 
And that occurred in the kitchen? 
It did. | 
THE COURT: What relevance does any-
( thing between — what does any relevance between — 
i I'm about t 
MR. McCULLOUGH: Well, Your Honor, 
:o --
25 . 
1 THE COURT: —• Defendant Krebs --
2 MR. McCULLOUGH: I'm about to ask the 
3 next que 5'.. : •. •• J r - , a• er i r^ t. 
4 THE COURT: Let's move forward. Pro-
5
 ceed. 
6 MR. McCULLOUGi . -;'.< 
7
 THE COURT: ] ' r: •. ;t hearing a divorce 
8 matter. 
9
 MK . M C C U L L O U ^ J : .-!.:. .
 : • 
10
 Q (By Mr. McCul lough) A f t e r :he s c u f f l e -'-
11
 the k i t c h e n , • • w h i c h , as you can t e 1 1 , the •; ^i;r t 
1 2




 A Glenda broke loose from Steve and went into 
15
 I :. oedl OOi- . S I /^ •' I a I I n w d (n T . 
16
 The lights was turned on, Glenda found 
17
 another u r- -.<; : ; ,v» Louoe. And Steve proceeded tc > 
18
 st. 1 1.1 k i: K * ;»..:.; .- \ 
19
 And Glenda screamed *" ^  me to pn ^ a I' i the 
20
 police* I didn't know the address phone number, 
21
 so 1 called ui 1 . 
22
 Q Let me ask you. •.when you say "knocked her 
23
 around/' what do you mean by that9 
24
 ' A He v n s \ * r;k ing, dud r ± I 1 i ns and pushing on 
25
 ' her to try to keep her out nf f H P : /drooru. 
26. 
Q To keep her out of the bedroom? 
A Yah. 
Q And — okay. 
What did you observe next? 
A Then I ran back to the bedroom, and I 
told Glenda the police was on their way, and still 
asked Steve to leave. 
And he would not. He was getting more vio-
lent. So I went to the kitchen. I got a knife, and 
then I asked Steve to leave. He turned around and he 
left. 
I went to the kitchen, put the knife down, 
went to the front door to look where Steve had 
gone. 
But I had called 911 the second time in 
between. I can't remember what. 
And I told them I didn't know the address, 
I was leaving the phone off the hook, please come 
because my son-in-law was beating up my daughter. 
Q Now, what you actually saw, Mrs. Williams, 
was that he was trying to keep her out of the room 
where this other person was; is that right? 
A Well, I don't really know. All I know is 
they was scuffling around. 
He wasn't saying that anybody else was in 
27. 
the room. He was just shoving, and puIJing, and 
P U <:} 1 ,'f h a • . f c:cd." ; i :jg • 
Q What you equate in your mind trying to 
keep her out of the room, where someone else was was 
beating her up? 
A Yes. 
Q That's the sane thing to you? 
A Not 
He u a °- k n o c k 11 \ g h e r a r o u n d . There's a 
difference, yes. 
Q Y'M] ;J,I if ,"i t' n i f V , 
Now, what did you do with the knife? 
A Yes, I did. 
I a s k e d S I: e v e t o 1 e a \ ' e ., 1 did not point 
at him. I did not threaten Steve. 
I said, "Steve, please leave -)•.-• house. 
Ih e p o lice M ( <•'• « i • in i 11,-, " , Ok a y . K a \ 
He turned and wer.: out th.j :,:or , :••; ; .: 
the kitchen knife back on the kitc h e n sink. 
Then I went to the front door to look 
o u t . That's when I seen Tonya and her .husband stand 
about 10, 15 feet back from the porch. 
THE COURT: Now, don* t — 
We try these 1 awsui ts , ma '" ai o, 1: •) ques t ioi i 
and answer. 
28. 
THE WITNESS: All right. 
THE COURT: Just answer the ques-
tion and don't volunteer. 
Counsel knows what he wants to get from 
you, and your counsel also knows what to do. 
THE WITNESS: All right. 
THE COURT: But we don!t try these 
cases by narrative. 
If you donft understand the question, tell 
me. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
THE COURT: If you understand it and 
don't know, say so. If you understand it and know, 
just answer and stop. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
Q (By Mr. McCullough) Did you threaten any-
body at all with a knife that night, Mrs. Williams? 
A No; I did not. 
Q Describe the knife. 
A It was a bread knife with teeth, you 
know. Jagged teeth. 
Q How long a blade? 
A I don't know. A bread knife. (Indicat-
ing.) 
THE COURT: A typical bread knife? 
29. 
1 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
2 Q (By . . •. ) You npver I hrPat ened 
3 anybody wirh it •'-.-: ; ight? 
4 A No; I did not. 
5 Q :J . • : * - - - - anybody ui th death, 
6 or dismemberment, or cutting up or anything like 
7 that? 
8 A " , t:. 
9 Q When you asked Steve to leave the room, 
10 did you use the word "please" as your daughter remem-
11 bers? 
12 A . I don ft remember. 
13 Q You never threatened the plaintiff in any 
14 nidi,:- ; ; -.. • night? 
15 A No, I did not. 
16 Q Did you, J anv manner, attempt to J;?,our-
17
 age- *,., , * < > \ . K , , , 
18 or anything else? 
19
 A I asked -- when Glenda was pulling her 
20 hair, I said it wasn't her that she should be mad at, 
21 it should be Steve. 
22 THE COURT: Did you say that at the 
23 time? 
24 ;
 :;. iv i TNESS: Yes, I did. 
25
 THE COURT: Because what I've heard 
30. 
so far, y ou're absolutely correct on that. But I'm 
not listening to a fight between your daughter and her 
ex-husband 
Q 




THE WITNESS: I understand that. 
(By Mr. McCullough) What did you observe ! 
were in the room between -- going on between ' 
Janet Sherwood? 
Glenda was holding onto her hair and had ' 
her in a corner. 1 
Q 
i A 
Did either of them seem upset? 













Was she — was Glenda — ! 
When you say "upset," how did she show she i 
She was saying that she was going to keep 
to prove that Steve was unfaithful. She 
to stay there until the police got there. 
W a s
 it a polite request, would you 
No. 
It was not? 
No. In that situation, no. 
THE COURT: I can imagine that. 
(By Mr. McCullough) Did you hear her 
3 1 . 











And what did she say? 
She said, "Where is she?" 
And did she state who she was referring to 
said, "she"? ! 
THE WITNESS: Is it all right if I 
language, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Pardon? 
THE WITNESS: I've got to use foul 
(By Mr. McCullough) I'm going to ask you 
what she said — 
THE COURT: Just a minute. Just a 
Now, stop. 
What was the question? 
Would you read it back? 
THE WITNESS: Do I have to use foul 
I don't -- j 
THE COURT: Oh, I think everybody in ! 
i 
I've been in the military, so I've heard 
. everything. And if there's anybody here with deli-




(By Mr. McCullough) What did she say? 1 
She said, "Where is the little bitch?" 
44. 
1
 Q C H phe say anything else? 
2 A M r .^-.- I some ;.t . i .. MHnw r r m M you 
3
 bring - how could you b r i n g someone into my 
^ house?" 
5
 Q A I L r J ":; 11 l 
6
 Then what occurred? 
7
 i A Thp'' - :^ v ^r -• i'• o bedroom. 
8
 I i : . k nd she said, 
9
 ] "Thatf s who \ < c ' v.* : :- r: *i-
10
 I And she says, "Can't you tell by looking 
11
 ' at her that she '" s iliesbed sleezy?" 
12




 Q D i J ^ii, .r.:-. .:•. •;•-•• : . h a t t i m e 
15
 ' about your t-nstJ in women or anything like thai? 
16
 J A Yah. She said I had poor taste i n 
17
 j women. 
18
 ' THE COURT: T h a t mi r tit : •- i n t e r e s t -
19 
.n<?, •- v h a t d o e s if show me a s • • r.he c a u s e o f 
2 0 i .. . I . i ' iniight a g a i n s t W i l l i a m s a n d 
21
 I Krebs? 
22
 I MR. McCULLOUGH: I : : : /- i f , ; i l 1 a l l 
1
 !::i e t o g e tl: l er , Y DI >nor . 
I rea.l ] - am t r v i n ^ to move i i . , .:»;. 
2 5
 ' THE COURT: V: 1 I wa<:
 : •- , 1 , - 1 y o u 
45. 
know the trouble Irm having. 
There is no objection before me, so that's 
why I haven't stopped you. But I just want you to 
understand what's bothering me about this, because 
time is going on. 
Proceed. 
MR. McCULLOUGH: Well, I think we'll 
finish well before 5:00, Your Honor. We're moving 
fine. 
Q (By Mr. McCullough) What happened 
next? 
A Glenda reached over and grabbed her 
hair. 
Q Where was Janet at the time that Glenda 
reached over and grabbed her hair? 
A In the corner. 
Q Did she go there of her own volition? 
A She backed into the corner. 
Q All right. 
Glenda pursued her and grabbed her 
hair? 
A Yah. 
Q What happened? 
A She grabbed her hair and was trying to 
hit at her. 
46. 
Q With her fist? 
A Vah. 
Q Did she succeed7 
THE COURT 1t vou know 
THE WITNESS: U n t I i r r>nt t-r, 
she had her bv the hair, T wis iust trvinf» I 
didn't ^ee, because 1 was facing Glenda at the 
time. 
Q (By Mr. McCullough^ TJh j r did vou hear 7 
A What i heard her say was, " I' n going t ^  
ki i ' ' • going L i i i i I i i, r >\ ( i I I j * 
and be in f—? sane room with n\ husband7" 
And she started to Kirk out af her 
Q How nany t J nes Mil n of <= n \ e err I i ek-
ing, if you know? 
A Twice. 
Q U 1 i i/iil 
What o c c u r r e d n e x t 7 
A I g u e s s h e r not" h e r v.as :\ "he ^ t c h e n 
( u J i i / j - s«>»>cbod\ >-n l h j pleve - ; - to g l e n d a 
t o k e e p her in t h e r e . 
And t h e n d l e n d a s a y s , "Mom, h r 1 p ' T m 
I t i ' J i i*j p r o h I em* I t e | ) i nr} iu i MI lu t t l 
Q Okay. 
Then what else did you see and hear 7 
47. 
A Her mother come in with a knife. 
Q Describe the knife, please. 
A It was about that long. (Indicating.) 
Q Was it sharp pointed? 
A Yes. 
Q What kind of blade? 
A It was jagged on the bottom. 
Q All right. 
What did she do with it? 
A She said — she says, "Let's stab the 
bitch." 
Q Did you see her actually make any move to 
stab the bitch? 
A She was probably about six to ten feet 
away. 
And I tried to make a move and tell her to 
calm down, and then she said — she pointed it out at 
me and said, "You make another step and I'll stab you 
along with her." 
Q What did you do then? 
A I tried to tell her to drop the knife and 
calm down. 
0 When you say "calm down," what would you 
say her demeanor -- her behavior was at that time? 
Was she calm? 
48. 
A No. 
Q Describe — describe her. 
A Well, I think maybe she thought I was 
hurting Glenda or something is why she run in the 
room like that. 
Q Okay. 
Can you show us, Mrs. Krebs, how she held 
the knife when she first of all said, "Let's stab the 
bitch," and then pointed it out at you. Can you show 
how -- with your hands how she held it? 
(Whereupon, the witness complied.) 
Q (By Mr. McCullough) Out in front of 
her? 
(The witness nodded his head.) 
All right. 
And then — all right. What else did she 
do? 
A She was saying some things, and I don't 
quite remember what was said. 
THE COURT: Who is "she"? 
THE WITNESS: She said some things — 
THE COURT: Who is "she"? 
THE WITNESS: My mother-in-law. 
THE COURT: You've got three women 










THE WITNESS: Sharlene. 
Mr. McCullough) Okay. And ~ 
then if I remember, the phone rang and 
went to go answer the phone. 
Q All right. 
Were you then still 
Glenda? 
A I then — Glenda, I 















then I got out 
in th le room with Janet 
guess, tried to get a 
in there. i 
and 
you at any time, Mr. 
danger? 
MR. SMITH: Well, 
see what relevance that 
THE COURT: 
sustain that objection. 
Q (By 














ran next door to 
Krebs, feel you 
I object, Your 
has. 
s not relevant. 
withdraw it. 
you observe any- | 
you to believe Janet was in any physi-
night? 
9 
the actions that the y displayed, and 
50. 
TESTIMONY OF TONYA CHIPMAN 
time, 
dial? 
I did hand the phone to him at this 
(By Mr. McCullough) What number did you 
A 911. 
Q All right. 
And you handed the phone to him? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q And then what did you do? 
A I went out the front door. 
Q All right. 
Previous to that time had you become aware 
of the presense of Janet Sherwood next door? 
A Yes, I had. 
Q How? 
A I went to high school with her. 
Q Yes. 
A And, urn, during the course of the conver-
sation I found out that that's who he went out with 
that night. 
Q All right. 
What did you do then when you went out-
side? 
A I went over next door to the Krebs' 
house. And I was really quite worried about the con-
87. 
1 dition in which I would find Janet. 
2 I went over and I knocked on the door, 
3 And — 
4 MR. SMITH: Your Honor, Ifm going to 
5 object. This is a narrative form again. Ifm object-
6 ing to that response. 
7 MR. McCULLOUGH: It !s responsive to 
8 my question, Your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: She may answer. 
10 MR. McCULLOUGH: Thank you. 
11 THE WITNESS: I 111 make it short. 
12 I went to the door. The mother, I 
13 assume --
14 Q (By Mr. McCullough) Let me ask you... the 
15 mother, you assume -- the person --
16 You came into contact with somebody; is 
17 that right? 
18 A Yes, I did. 
19 Q Can you find that person in the courtroom 
20 today? 
21 A Yes. She's in the blue dress. 
22 Q That's the lady closest to the jury box 
23 at counsel table? 
24 A Yes. 
25 MR. McCULLOUGH: The record may then 
88. 
1 show she's referring to Defendant Williams, Your 
2 Honor. 
3
 THE COURT: It does. 
4
 MR. McCULLOUGH: All right. 
5
 And what occurred when you saw Mrs. Wil-
6 liams? 
7
 MR. SMITH: Your Honor, I object. 
8 There's no relevance to this line of questioning. 
9
 May I voir dire the witness very briefly, 
1
° Your Honor? 
11
 THE COURT: You may. 
12 
13
 VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
14 
15
 BY MR. SMITH: 
1
^ Q Mrs. Chipman, did you ever see the plain-
17
 tiff in this case, Miss Sherwood, in the house? 
18




 Q You've just testified that you went over 
21
 to the house. 
22




 A When I went to the house, no. I saw her 
25
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2 A That !s correct 
3 MR. SMITH: That rs all, Your 
4 Honor. 
5 I THE COURT: Proceed. 
6 ( 
7 I DIRECT EXAMINATION (cont.) 
8 
9 BY MR. McCULLOUGH: 
10 Q Bat you did observe the defendant, Mrs. 
11 Williams, correct? 
12 A Yes, I did. 
13 Q Would you tell us what you observed, 
14 please. 
15 MR. SMITH: Your Honor, Ifm going to 
16 object. There's no relevance to this line of qaes-
1^  tioning. 
18 She has testified she did not go in the 
19 house, she did not see any — she didn't even see Mrs. 
20 Krebs. She didn't see the plaintiff. 
21 THE COURT: Gentlemen, if this were a 
22 jury trial you may be sure that a lot of evidence 
23 that's been offered here would not be admitted on the 
24 court's own motion. 
25 But I want to move this forward, so I think 
91. 
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I'll overrule the objection. Proceed, 
MR. McCULLOUGH: 
(By Mr. McCullough) 
be that — for what 
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; or anything 
1 A 
this, Mr. 
what I cl 
emotional 
I was worried about the condition of 
And you went to check on her? 
Yes, I did. 
What did you see then when you saw Mrs. 
She came to the door with a knife. 
Describe the knife, please. ! 
To the best of my knowledge, it was just 
knife, one that you would use -- maybe a ! 
knife, to the best of my knowledge. 
How long was the blade, as best you can 
Approximately maybe three inches, four 
Was it a sharp tip? 
Yes, it was. 
Did you see teeth or any other jagged edge 
on it? 
Not that I can remember. 
THE COURT: What do you claim for 
McCullough? 
MR. McCULLOUGH: Your Honor, the — 
aim specifically is intentional infliction of 
distress and a conspiracy in the assault. 
9 3 . 
1 And what I'm suggesting, Your Honor, is 
2 that what Mrs. Williams' heart in the whole thing 
3 was, to hold at bay anyone who might help Janet Sher-
4 wood out. And that's exactly what she's about to 
5 testify to. 
6 THE COURT: Well, proceed. 
7 MR. McCULLOUGH: Thank you. 
8 Q (By Mr. McCullough) Describe for us -- and 
9 use your hands if you need to -- how she held the 
10 knife. 
11 A When she came to the door this is how she 
12 held the knife. (Indicating.) 
13 Q Did you feel that was a threatening ges-
14 ture? 
15 A Yes, I did. I backed off the porch and 
16 still continued to ask if she could please release 
17 Janet. 
18 Q All right. 
19 Would you describe the conversation that 
20 occurred between you and Mrs. Williams at that 
21 time? 
22
 I A At the time when I went over, I knocked on 
the door and asked if she could please release 23 
24
 Janet. I wanted her to come out. 
25 Q When you say "release," did you hear any-
94. 
thing prior to asking that question? 
A I heard Janet in the background. 
Q What did you hear? 
A "Please let me out of here." 
I called for her. And when I called for 
her, she didn't answer. But before I started to call, 
I heard a plea for, "Please help me." 
Q All right. 
Did you hear anything else from inside? 
A Not that I can recall. 
Q All right. 
So you went to the door, you confronted 
Mrs. Williams. 
And again, the conversation, please? 
A She came to the door with a knife. I 
asked her please to let Janet go. 
At that time she held the knife and told 
me -- or asked me ~ if I would like to come in and 
get the same thing that Janet was going to get. 
Q Did she refer specifically to what Janet 
was going to get? 
A Yes, she did. 
Q What was that? 
A She told me she was going to kill her. 
Q Do you feel, then, that when she said "the 
95. 





She said, "Steven, I know you're in 
Open this god damned door or I'm going to 
down and kill you." j 
Were you able to tell whether it was the J 


















; on, I saw 
I figured it was the front door. 
Did you hear anything other than the 1 
I heard pounding on the door before 
All right. 
And then what occurred? 
Urn, then they came in. And I was sitting 
d, and she went down the hall -~ 
Who was "she"? 
Mrs. Krebs. 
That's the woman in the middle at counsel 
Yes, it is. 
And go ahead. 
And she went to the bedroom that was 
om me, which I — when she turned the light 
it must have been their bedroom. 
And then she turned around and flipped on 















t in the room that I was in and lunged for j 
And Mr. Krebs grabbed her and threw her 
floor, and the mother started beating up on 
leave her alone, not to get her, to protect 
e whore. 
All right. 
Let me back up just a little bit. 
When she came into the room, she turned on 
and lunged. 
Was it all basically one motion? 
Pretty close. 
All right. 
And where were you in the room at this 
I was sitting on the edge of the bed. 
And what did you do when she lunged at 
I jumped up. 
And Steven stood in front of me, and he 





whole time trying to get a hold of my 
When you say he backed you into a cor-
he pushing you, was he — what was your impres-
106. 
sion he was trying to accomplish at the time? 
A I was standing behind him hoping he would 
give me a little protection. 
Q All right. 
And while this was going on, what, if 
anything, did Mrs. Krebs say? 
A She said, "You fucking bitch. You little 
whore. How can you be in here?" 
Q Did she say anything else? 
A She said, "I'm going to kill you." 
Q Did that statement put you in fear of 
bodily injury? 
A Yes, it did. 
Q Anything else she did at that time to put 
you in fear of bodily injury? 
A She was kicking at me, and she kneefd me 
in the side, and — 
Q Now, you say, "knee'd you and kicked at 
you." 
Was she able to get around Mr. Krebs 
then, or --
A Yes, she was. 
Q All right. 
Describe what you remember about — we 
have a picture at this point of you kind of in the 
107. 
1 corner and him between the two of you, 
2 What occurred? 
3 A She had gotten hold of my hair and he was 
4 pushing her away, and I was just kind of going with 
5 them. 
6 Q Because your hair was going with them; is 
7 that correct? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q And at this time what was she -- she had 
10 one or both hands on your hair? 
11 A She had one. 
12 Q Do you remember what she was doing with 
13 | her other hand? 
14 A She was trying to get me with the other 
15 hand. 
16 Q Show us, if you would with your hands, 
17 what motions she may have been making. 
18 A Urn, she had a fist at one point and was 
19 hitting at me. And she had scratched me. I had 
20 scratch marks on my neck. 
21 Q Did she — when you say she made a fist and 
22 hit at you, did she actually strike you with her 
23 fist? 
24 A Once or twice. 
25











i hair, as 













On my abdomen. 
Any other parts that you remember? 
No. 
What about use of her feet? 
She kicked me in the shins. 
How many times? 
Just a couple. 
How long did she retain hold of your 
best you can remember? It probably seems 
Forever. 
— longer than it was. 
Is that about the best you can tell us? 
Urn, I donft — I didn't have a watch. 
no clock in the room. I have no idea how 
Until the police arrived. I know that 
All right. 
What else occurred then after she came at 
ed your hair, struck and kicked at you? 
Mrs. Williams came into the room with the 
escorted Mr. Krebs out of the room. 
Did she say anything that you remember with 
109 . 
9 
1 A No, I don't. 
2 Q When she had the knife in the hand? 
3 A Mrs. Krebs was screaming at me the whole 
4 time, telling me she was going to kill me, telling me 
5 I she knew karate and she could kill me. 
6 THE COURT: That was Mrs. Krebs? 
7 I THE WITNESS: Uh-huh. 
Q (By Mr. McCullough) So because of that, 
you didn't pay a lot of attention to Mrs. Williams — 
10 I A No. I was concentrating too hard on stay-
11
 ing alive, 
12
 J Q When you say, "concentrating too hard on 
staying alive," did you have reason — did you at that 
time fear for your life? 
15 I A Yes, I did. 
16 Q Why'? 
17
 I A Because her mother had the knife and she 
was — just the threat. 
19
 | Q Okay. 
20
 I Specifically, what threats were these? 
21
 I A That, "I'm going to kill you." 
22
 Q Which one said that? 
23
 A Mrs. Krebs. She was constantly saying 
2* I it 






Constantly. Can you give us any kind of a 
rough idea how many times she may have said it? 
A Probably 20 times. 
Q And you felt that she really meant it? 
A Yes, I did. The look on her face, she 
meant it. 
Q Didn't seem to you to be a polite way of 
just asking you to stick around until the police 
arrived? 
A (No audio response.) 
Q Answer "yes" or "no" please. 
A No. 
Q What else did she do? 
A Urn — 
THE COURT: When you say "she" --
MR. McCULLOUGH: Ifm talking about 
Mrs. Krebs. 
THE WITNESS: What else did she do 
as to what? 
Q (By Mr. McCullough) What else did she do 
other than kick at you, scratch you, hit you and grab 
your hair? 
A She had asked me if -- why I was there, if 
they had gotten a --



























there. And I says, "Well, he had told me he had got-
ten a divorce." And she said, "Well, don't you ask 
for divorce papers?" And I told her, "No, I 
didn' t.M 
Q All right. 
Anything else that occurred between you 
two? 
A When she -- after a while she had both 
hands in my hair, and she was twisting my hair. And 
I could hear it ripping, and so I got a hold of her 
wrist. 
And she told me, "Let go of my wrist or 
I'm going to kill you." 
And I told her, "I'll let go of your wrist 
when you let go of my hair." 
Q And this went on for — 
A Until the police arrived. 
And she told me that she was holding me there 
until the police arrived so that she could press 
charges against me. 
Q Did she state what she was going to press 
charges for? 
A Something of being in her house. 
Q Did she call you any other names other than 






Just a whore, and a bitch and a slut. 
Oh, she called me the neighborhood whore, 
Tonya was out calling my name, and — 
What did she say about that? 
She said --
Her mother came in and said, "No. Now her 
friend is out there looking for her." | 







And she said, she says, "Yes, you do. Your 
friend." And I said, "That must be his neigh-
went to school with her for one year." 
Mrs. Krebs then said, "What are you? The 
"hood whore?" 
I gather, Janet, that this conversation 
a cool, calm conversation such as you and I are 









No; it was not. 
Was there screaming? 
On her part, yes. I didn't do much talk-
just wanted to get out. 
Did you ask her to let you go? 
Yes, I did. 
What did you say? 
I said, "Please let me go." 
1 1 3 . 
Q And what was her reply? 
A And she said, "No. I'm holding you here 
until the police come so I can press * charges." 
Q Did you attempt to get out of the room? 
A I did nothing. 
Q Now, when the police came, what do you 
remember was occurring at the time the police 
came? 
A Sergeant Finlayson came in and he — 
Q What — where were you specifically in 
reference to Mrs. Krebs at the time he came in? 
A I was in the corner, the northeast corner 
of that bedroom. And my head — 
The way she had my hair, my head was 
turned and so my knees were bent, because I couldn't 
lift my head. 
And Officer -- Sergeant Finlayson came in 
and he asked her to release me. 
Q Prior to the time -- before the time the 
police came in... 
Now, you testified that Mrs. Williams 
came in once with a knife and escorted Steven out. 
Do you remember whether she came in another 
time or anything? 
A I remember her coming in and out. I don't 
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